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Abstract 
 
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to explore whether any discrepancy exists between 
the disclosed in the Shari’ah Supervisory Board (SSB) Reports of Islamic banks and the 
disclosure index which was based on stakeholders’ expectation. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – This study uses contents analysis as the research method 
to explore Shariâ’ah audit reporting practices of Islamic Banks. 
 
Findings – The study finds that the level of disclosures overall by IFIs in the sample is rather 
low compared to the stakeholders’ expectations. 
 
Practical implications – This paper has important implications for policy makers as it 
contributes to the debate on that uniform disclosure standards across the globe need to be 
implemented to ensure a uniform level of disclosure by Islamic banks. 
 
Originality/value – This study is amongst the few studies that examine and explore the 
nature and extent of Shari’ah Supervisory Board in Islamic banks. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The rapid growth of the Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) indicates the global recognition of 
the emerging role of these institutions in contributing to the development of responsible and 
ethical banking. However, this growth is not in match with the demand for Islamic finance 
products. For instance, quoting Ernst & Young, the Financial Times reported in 2012 (3rd 
November, 2012) that the global supply of sukuk (Shari’ah-compliant bonds) is less than half 
that of investor demand. IFIs operate according to the jurisprudence and the rules of the 
economic and social order of Islam, by applying the Shari’ah business code of conduct. In the 
early period of development, this type of financial services was used individually between 
different traders.  However, this has been changed and they are now representatives of a new 
wave of corporations whose social goals are largely as important as profit-making (Haniffa and 
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Hudaib, 2007b). IFIs have expanded worldwide and the system continues to grow at the rate 
of 15–20 per cent annually (Hussain et al., 2016).   
 
Islamic banking operates under a different structure of corporate governance from the one 
used in conventional banking. IFIs aim to promote and develop the application of Islamic 
principles, laws and traditions to finance, banking transactions and related business affairs. An 
Islamic bank is obliged to appoint a board of Islamic scholars called the Shari’ah Supervisory 
Board (SSB) or the Shari’ah Advisory Council (SAC) to monitor the bank’s operations and 
transactions. By doing so, the Islamic bank ensures that business activities are acceptable on 
the basis of fair and its legitimate profits and operations are consistent with the Shari’ah’s 
principles, such as the prohibitions of interest usury, monopoly and hoarding. Islam wishes to 
exterminate all traces of Zulm1 from human society (Rahman et al., 2010). It has been generally 
accepted in the literature that a banking system in the Islamic society expects to contribute fully 
to the achievement of key socio-economic goals of Islam (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007a; Aribi 
and Gao, 2015). Some of the most important goals and functions under Islamic banking are 
socio-economic justice and equitable distribution of income and wealth (Aribi and Gao, 2010). 
Justice is an indispensable ingredient of the Islamic banking system. 
 
The SSB or Shari’ah committee is one of the most important governance mechanisms 
applied in IFIs to ensure the financial services business to comply with Shari’ah (Besar et al., 
2009). The establishment of the SSB is imperative to instill public confidence on the purity of 
the operations of IFIs, as it serves as a mechanism to safeguard the management and operations 
of IFIs in order to comply with the Islamic principles in the formulation of the policies and 
strategies of the institutions. Although corporate governance in IFIs has attracted much 
attention in the literature (e.g., Safieddine, 2009; Paino et al., 2011; Alnasser and Muhammed, 
2012), very little is written on Shari’ah audit (Yaacob and Donglah, 2012) and Shari’ah audit 
reports in IFIs. While Shari’ah audit is a very important part of corporate governance in IFIs, 
which is required under the Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial 
Institutions (AAOIFI) standards, Shari’ah audit in IFIs is basically an under-researched area 
(Besar et al., 2009; Yaacob and Donglah, 2012). Little has been known of the disclosure of 
Shari’ah audit reports and whether such reports meet stakeholder expectations.  
                                                          
1 Zulm is an Islamic term that refers to all forms of inequity injustice, exploitation, oppression and wrongdoing. 
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The aim of this paper is to explore whether any discrepancy exists between the disclosures in 
SSB reports of Islamic banks and the disclosure index that was developed following the 
AAOIFI and previous literature.  Our disclosure index was developed covering five areas: the 
format of the report, the background of SSB, audit process, unlawful transactions and Zakah. 
Some of these disclosures are the requirements of the financial reporting standard promulgated 
by the AAOIFI (2015). It is worth mentioning that AAOIFI standards are deemed the most 
outstanding reference for Islamic banking industry and it serve as guideline (Sarea and 
Hanefah, 2013). It has been argued that AAOIFI standards can be used as a starting point that 
may help lead to an improved IFIs system of reporting (Harahap, 2003). Nevertheless, it has 
been the only complete standards on audit we have so far. Currently, AAOIFI standards are 
officially adopted by a number of central banks and financial authorities on a mandatory basis 
or as guidance (AAOIFI, 2015). However, this study does not aim to investigate IFIs’ 
compliance with standards; rather it examines whether the SSB reports have disclosed relevant 
information to stakeholders. The study finds that the level of disclosures by IFIs in the sample 
is rather low compared to our index benchmark. Many institutions that claim to adopt the 
AAOIFI standards actually do not comply with the disclosure requirements. Using the Shari’ah 
audit reporting index developed in this study we reveal that the score for all categories within 
the index are well below the assumed expectation. The remainder of this paper is structured as 
follows. The next section discusses the theoretical background and presents a literature review. 
Section three explains the research methodology used for this study. Section four provides the 
results and analysis. Section five concludes the paper and outlines policy recommendations. 
 
 
2. Accountability in Islam 
From an Islamic perspective, the perceived relationship of individuals and firms with God 
affects the concept of accountability (Maali et al., 2006). To a Muslim, all resources are God-
given, and ownership of wealth belongs to God. Individuals are only trustees and it is to God 
that accountability is ultimately due. Muslims, as required by Islam, have to question their 
actions or hold themselves accountable before being held accountable by Allah in the Day of 
Judgment for what they have done in their life (Abdul-Rahman and Goddard, 1998). The word 
Hesab in Arabic that is synonym to “account” repeated more than eight times in different verses 
the Holy Qur’an (Askary and Clarke, 1997). According to Lewis (2001 & 2005), the basic 
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similarity between Hesab or account and accounting lies in the responsibility of individuals 
and businesses to carry out duties as described by Islam. Accountability in this context means 
an obligation of businesses to provide an account to the Islamic community at large, which has 
the right to know about the effects of operations of organisations on its well-being (Lewis, 
2005). This presumes to influence the way of conducting business in an Islam society and 
Islamic firms are therefore expected to report on their fulfillment of such a responsibility (Aribi 
and Gao, 2012). 
 
One of the major characteristics of the Islamic corporate governance system is the SSB to 
guarantee that all the operations, contracts and procedures of a business organisation conform 
to the Islamic code (Lewis, 2005; Grais and Pellegrini, 2006). It is very critical for IFIs to 
emphasise the compliance with Islamic principles in all their transactions and products. In fact, 
one of the primary objectives of accounting and reporting from an Islamic perspective is to 
ensure that the business discharges the Islamic concept of accountability (Haniffa, 2001; Maali 
et al. 2006). The emphasis on accountability from an Islamic perspective would render Islamic 
corporate reports to include information that meet Shari’ah ethics and morals. Since Islamic 
IFIs need to continually maintain the confidence of ethically conscious stakeholders who 
require assurance on the compliance of their products and operations with Shari’ah, the SSB 
audit report in Islamic bank is important as it reflects the accountability of IFIs not only to the 
users of the financial statements, but more important, to the Creator, Allah S.W.T (Kasim and 
Sanusi, 2013).  The purpose of the religious audit is to assure both insiders and outsiders that 
God’s laws are being followed by a business organisation in its business dealings. Such 
processes involved in Shari’ah audit and supervision are widely observed in IFIs (Algaoud and 
Lewis, 1999; Lewis, 2001), although the governance principles adopted differ across the full 
range of business activities. The roles of Sharia’ah auditors are basically threefold. First, they 
give advice to the board and management of a business organisation about the Sharia’ah 
acceptability of business contractual arrangements and new product development. Second, they 
provide an independent report to inform shareholders on the compliance of management with 
Islamic principles and to the extent that the business is run Islamically. Third, they carry out 
an audit of the Zakah with a view to establishing that the Zakah fund is being correctly assessed 
and properly administered (Shafii et al., 2013 a). 
 
 5 
 
The most obvious purpose of the SSB is to certify for practicing Muslim consumers that a 
financial product or service being offered is acceptable from the Islamic legal perspective and 
is therefore lawful. Such certification, generally documented in a formal Fatwa (i.e., Shari’ah 
position paper), may be thought of as a form of due diligence. In effect, the Shari’ah supervisor 
or SSB, performs this due diligence on behalf of consumers who lack access to the details of 
what is offered to them and, who don’t have the experience or qualifications to evaluate those 
details in light of Shari’ah teachings (Lewis, 2005). By assuming responsibility for the 
Shari’ah compliance of an IFI, including its policies and practices, Shari’ah supervision places 
itself in a position of directly representing the religious interests of the Muslim investors or 
consumers (Karim, 2001; Kammla et al., 2006; Besar et al., 2009; Aribi and Gao; 2012). The 
Shari’ah advisors’ audit report is now mandated as a component of the Islamic banks’ annual 
reports (Karim, 2001; Maali et al., 2006; Aribi and Gao, 2010). It certifies that the operations 
of a bank and transactions undertaken during the year are in compliance with Shari’ah 
principles (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007b). There are instances where a Shari’ah audit of 
transactions reveals a discrepancy and then the advisors are required to report it as part of their 
certification, providing the details of the amount that, for example, was transferred to a charity 
account to offset the value of the said transaction (Lewis and Algaoud, 2001). 
 
Islamic finance is one of the fastest growing segments of the global financial industry (Hussain 
et al., 2016). Their distinctive corporate culture generates a collective morality and spirituality 
combined with the production of goods and services, which sustains the growth and 
advancement of the Islamic way of life. The employees of IFIs are expected to follow: for 
instance, “....all the staff of such banks and customers dealing with them must be reformed 
Islamically and act within the framework of an Islamic formula, so that any person approaching 
an Islamic Bank should be given the impression that he is entering a sacred place to perform a 
religious ritual, that is the use and employment of capital for what is acceptable and satisfactory 
to God” (Janahi, 1995, p.42).  
 
Islamic banking that operates under the profit-and-loss sharing mode, purchases and sells goods 
and services, and offers services for fees (Archer and Karim, 2012; Kettell, 2010, (Archer and 
Karim, 2012). It is quite different from the one common to conventional banking. A bank 
operating in Islamic surroundings is expected to be conscious of the impact of its activities on 
the community (Rahman et al., 2010). Shari’ah is based on Islamic teachings and provides 
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guidance for the way Muslims should live their lives. The banking activities based on the 
Shari’ah principles represent the absolute ethical codes of Islamic religion and culture, which 
impose strong social obligations on Muslim individuals and organisations (Maali et al., 2006). 
Shari’ah supervision is the process of ensuring that a financial product or service complies 
with Islamic legal precepts and principles, either by conforming (to one degree or another) to 
a recognised Islamic legal norm or by not violating the norm. 
 
The objectives of corporate reporting in an IFI are to show the institution’s compliance with 
Shari’ah and also to assist users in making economic decisions. According to the AAOIFI 
(2015), IFIs should disclose all information necessary to inform the community about their 
operations and this requirement is related to the concept of accountability where the user 
community has the right to know how the operational activities of an institution are affecting 
their wellbeing. A number of studies have attempted to investigate the disclosures of the 
Shari’ah board in Islamic banks (e.g., Besar et al., 2009; Paino et al., 2011; Puad et al., 2015; 
Ramli et al., 2015). Besar et al. (2009) critically analyse the Shari’ah review and Shari’ah 
reporting practice in Malaysia. Their findings indicate there is an expectation gap between the 
standards issued by the AAOIFI and the actual Shari’ah review practice in those Islamic banks. 
Paino et al. (2011) study Shari’ah social responsibilities and corporate governance in IFIs by 
analysing 17 Islamic banks in Malaysia. Their results provide preliminary findings on the 
disclosures of these matters pertaining to improving corporate image and discharging their 
responsibility as an Islamic entity. Puad et al. (2015) analyse how the Shari’ah review and 
Shari’ah reporting are practiced of Islamic banks in three different countries including 
Malaysia, Pakistan and Bahrain. They find the Shari’ah audit report has been prepared based 
on different guidelines in each country, resulting in different presentations and disclosures 
among these countries. Ramli et al. (2015) assess the Shari’ah governance disclosure of seven 
Islamic banks in Malaysia based on a developed Shari’ah governance index. They also analyse 
whether there are differences in the Shari’ah governance disclosure between institutional 
owned and non-institutional owned IFIs as well as between domestic-owned IFIs and foreign-
owned IFIs. To the best of our knowledge, no studies have specifically investigated the SSB 
disclosure across countries. This study contributes to the literature by examining the SSB 
disclosures contained in the annual reports published by 12 IFIs in the Gulf region and 
Malaysia. Malaysia is widely regarded as a leading country in developing IFIs and promoting 
Shari’ah governance. 
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3. Research Methods 
  
Since Shari’ah audit information is predominately presented in the annual report of an 
institution, this study will use annual reports as a source of data. This study examines 12 IFIs 
operating in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and Malaysia. We focus mainly on 
Malaysia and GCC countries as they are the most significant players, which account for the 
vast majority of Islamic finance assets (GIFR, 2016). Our sample was initially based on 24 
fully flagged IFIs in these countries listed on the website of the World Database for Islamic 
Banking and Finance (WDIBF). We exclude any Islamic bank with missing annual report 
during 2008-2010. Our final sample consists of 12 IFIs whose annual reports for the years 
2008, 2009, and 2010 were available in English on the website. 
 
To explore the communication practices of SSB reports in our sample, we used content 
analysis, which is a widely employed tool in accounting research through codifying texts into 
various themes (or categories) in line with selected criteria (Krippendorff, 1980). Content 
analysis provides the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content 
of communication (Berelson, 1952, p. 18). An essential element of content analysis is the 
selection and development of categories into which content units can be classified. The 
categories and items of this study were mainly drawn from our understanding of Islamic 
literature as discussed in the previous section and the Islamic perspective of accountability (see 
e.g., Baydoun and Willett, 1997& 2000; Gambling and Karim, 1986 &1991; Lewis, 2001). We 
also considered items required to be disclosed by the AAOIFI (20015) and adopted in the 
previous research of Islamic banking disclosure (e.g., Maali et al., 2006; Haniffa and Hudaib, 
2007b; Williams and Zinkin, 2010). Since our interest is to assess the degree of congruence 
between the expected and disclosed information, we designed our research instrument 
(checklist) to cover five themes constituting the stakeholder expectations such as report format, 
background of the SSB, audit process, unlawful transactions and Zakah.  
 
Report format: Under the standard format theme, we expect a SSB report to include a report 
title and the date of report, contact details and signatures of SSB members.  
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Background of the SSB: It is vital that SSB members to have knowledge and competence in 
relevant fields associated with banking as well as knowledge of Shar’ah, especially those areas 
related to business transactions. Hence, we expect a SSB report to communicate full 
information on the SSB member’s background. 
Audit process: we expect a SSB report to disclose information on how the audit process is 
performed in examining the transactions and other activities of the institutions such as whether 
SSB views were based on either a full or a sample review of transactions,  appropriate tests, 
procedures and review work processes.   
Unlawful transactions: Shari’ah compliance is the cornerstone of an IFI business and 
therefore it must avoid transactions that contradict with Shari’ah law. However, since IFIs in 
many cases are operating in a mixed economy they are forced to enter into transactions that are 
inconsistent with Shari’ah law. If such transactions occurred, the SSB report should provide 
full information on such transactions, income generated from these transactions and the SSB 
opinion on these transactions. 
Zakah: IFIs are required either paying Zakah on behalf of their shareholders or calculating and 
disclosing the amount payable per share in their annual reports. It is expected that the SSB 
report to include the SSB opinion and information on the sources of Zakah and the calculation 
of Zakah payment. 
Each theme has a number of sub-themes presented in Appendix 1. Reliability and validity in 
content analysis refer to a measuring procedure, which provides the same results on repeated 
processes. The previous studies argue that content analysis is not reliable if it is conducted only 
once or only by one person (Neuendorf, 2002). The content validity of the initial research 
instrument for this study was reviewed independently by two researchers followed by a third 
experienced academic who discussed the ambiguities raised in the review. The final disclosure 
checklist includes 25 items. To ensure the reliability of the research instrument, the authors and 
the two independent researchers scored four randomly selected banks. Then, the results from 
the three researchers were compared. However, given that the final research disclosure index 
was generally agreed by all researchers, the differences in the compliance scores from the 
researchers were insignificant. 
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The approach to scoring items is essentially dichotomous in that an item in the research 
instrument scores one if communicated, and zero if it is not (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Haniffa 
and Hudib, 2007b), and is additive and equally weighted to avoid potential scoring bias and 
scaling problems (Cook, 1989). In order to explore Shari’ah audit reporting practices of IFIs 
we attempt to develop a Shari’ah audit reporting index (SAI). The score is calculated as follows: 
𝑺𝑨𝑰 = ∑    
𝑋𝑖
𝑁
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
Where: SAI = Shari’ah audit reporting index score for Bank j; N  = number of items expected 
for Bank j; Xi = 1 if the item is disclosed, 0 if the item is not disclosed; and 0≤ 𝑋𝑖 ≤ 1. The 
scores for each item were then added and equally weighted to derive a final score for each 
institution. 
 
 
4. Results 
 
Table 1 presents Shari’ah Audit reporting index (SAI) ranking of 12 IFIs for three years. It can 
be seen from Table 1 that those institutions coming closest to meeting the benchmark were 
Jordan Islamic Bank (JIB), Capivesta, Albaraka Islamic Bank (AIB), and Faisal Islamic Bank 
(FIB) while the lowest SAI for three consecutive years were Kuwaiti Finance House (KFH) 
and Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank (ADIB). Based on the three-year mean of SAI for each bank, it 
can be seen that the range was 0.21–0.65. This means that JIB scored the highest with 65 per 
cent of the constructs under the five categories being disclosed in its annual report, while KFH 
addressed only 21 per cent of the constructs in the research instruments. A summary of the SAI 
disclosures made by each institution in the sample is presented in Table 2, which presents three-
years means on the five categories for each organisation. As showed in Table 2, the level of 
SAI disclosure varies greatly among categories and the SSBs in general were more inclined to 
report information on the standard format of the report (such as title, date, addressee and 
signature) and the background of SSB while showed less attention to unlawful transactions. 
Many of these expected Shari’ah audit items listed in our index are required by the AAOIFI 
standards. We test whether following AAOIFI standards could explain differences in the extent 
of disclosure.  
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[Insert Table 1 here]  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
As showed in Table 1 nine IFIs in the sample claim to follow the AAOIFI standards. The mean 
of SAI by institutions that followed the AAOIFI was 0.515 compared to 0.326 by IFIs that did 
not apply the AAOIFI standards. A t-test shows the difference between the two groups is 
statistically significant.2 Moreover, the differences in the level of disclosure varied across the 
different themes between the two groups. It is worth mentioning that many institutions that 
claimed to adopt the AAOIFI standards did not actually comply with the disclosure 
requirements as shown in our analysis. 
4.1 Standard format of reports  
Under the standard format theme, we expect a SSB report to include a title and date of   report, 
contact details and signatures of SSB members. All these items are required by the AAOIFI 
standards. The results are shown in Table 3. The item disclosed by most IFIs is the title of 
report. The three-year mean of ASI for this category ranges from 33 per cent to 100 per cent, 
suggesting variations and inconsistencies between the items among these institutions. The 
number of IFIs disclosed under this category increased in 2010. Only one bank namely AIB 
communicated all the items over the three years in their reports and scored the highest SAI 
with 100 per cent. Despite the requirement of the AAOIFI standards, banks such as TI, IIAB 
and BIB that claim to follow the AAOIFI did not sign their SSB reports over the three-year 
period. This perhaps raises the question of whether IFIs truly follow the AAOIFI standards. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
4.2 Background of SSB members 
Bassens et al. (2012) explain the importance of having extensive knowledge of Shari’ah Law 
in assessing the ‘Islamic’ character of an institution’s operations and assisting the development 
of Shari’ah compliant products and services. As they embody necessary entry-points into 
Islamic circuits of knowledge and authority, members of the SSB can be regarded as 
‘gatekeepers’ of Islamic financial circuits (Bassens et al., 2012). Therefore, the SSB is 
                                                          
2 To determine the robustness of the results, a non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test was also performed. The 
result of U-test supports the findings with p-value <0.05. 
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entrusted with the responsibility of monitoring the conduct of those trusted and providing 
assurance that the operation of the institutions is conducted in accordance with Islamic 
principles. Stakeholders may need to assess the profile of those who provide this assurance.   
 
In this study we expect IFIs to disclose a set of aspects on their SSB, including the description 
of board members (e.g., name, position, picture, profile and remuneration). Table 4 indicates 
that none of the items in this category are required by the AAOIFI. Table 2 shows that all 
institutions in the sample communicated information on the background of SSB. The three-
year mean of SAI ranges from 0.25 to 1.00. Six IFIs communicated more than 50 per cent of 
the constructs under this dimension: BIB, JIB, IIAB, MT, and Capivesta. Only one institution 
(i.e., MT) consistently disclosed all the items and scored 100 per cent. We observe a downward 
trend in communication on this category by KFH that disclosed only one item over the three-
year period. All IFIs under this study seem to disclose the names of their SSB members, but 
only three institutions (i.e., BIB, JIB, and MT) consistently disclosed the pictures of their SSB 
members over the three years. There is inconsistency for institutions among KFH, IIAB, FBS, 
and TI. It should be noted that a Shari’ah auditor must have a good knowledge in accounting 
and also in Shari’ah to be able to understand and audit IFIs and their operations as the 
‘gatekeeper’ (Shafii et al., 2013b). Following on this, IFIs are expected to disclose the 
qualifications held by their SSB members to assure stakeholders that their SSB have the 
competence and required knowledge deemed necessary for their job (i.e. specialised Shari’ah 
knowledge as applied in Islamic banking and finance, and accounting and auditing knowledge 
and skills). However, only four IFIs (i.e., GFH, Arcapita, MT and Capivesta) disclosed the 
qualifications of their SSB members over the period. It is also expected that remunerations of 
SSB members to be disclosed as part of transparency by IFIs. Remunerations of SSB members 
were only disclosed by six institutions and all were in the notes to the account section of the 
annual report. The low level of disclosure was not expected as transparency in Islam is viewed 
as an integrated part of the general meritorious and ethical tendency of business practice and 
the faith (Maali et al., 2006; Haniffa and Hudib, 2007a). In general, the low level of disclosure 
under this category could be due to the fact that all items under this category are not required 
by the AAOIFI.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
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  4.3 Audit process 
All institutions in the sample disclosed some sorts of audit process related information as shown 
in Table 5. Table 2 reveals the scores of disclosure under this category. The mean level of 
disclosure was 42.75 per cent. Three IFIs disclosed more than 50% of the constructs under this 
dimension: BIB, JIB and FIB. The three-year mean ASI ranges from 0.23 to 0.67, with the 
lowest being KFH and the highest being Capivesta. KFH only disclosed one item under this 
category over three years. Table 5 shows only two banks in the sample, JIB and FIB, 
consistently reported on the number of meetings held. In expressing an opinion on the 
operations of an Islamic bank, the SSB reports of three banks, ADIB, BIB and FIB over three 
years state that their reviews were based on auditing of all transactions. This statement 
emphasizes the importance of Shari’ah compliance. The SSB reports of KFH 2010, GFH 2010, 
and MT 2010 declare that their reviews were based on samples. For instance, MT examined ‘on 
a test basis, each type of transaction, the relevant documentation and procedures adopted by 
Takaful Malaysia’ (MT, 2010, p. 97). Without exception, all IFIs in the sample disclosed the 
scope of audit, and opinions on compliance with Shari’ah in operation and the distribution of 
profit and loss. The high level of disclosure under these items are expected, since the main 
purpose of the Shari’ah review is to ensure all the activities are carried out in compliance with 
the Shari’ah.  
The following quotations provide an inside perspective from a few examples of these 
statements: 
 
We have planned and performed our review so as to obtain all information and 
explanations considered necessary by us for the purpose of providing us with 
sufficient evidence to provide reasonable assurance that the bank has not violated 
Islamic Shari’ah rules and principles (BIB, 2010, p. 48). 
By following up the performance of Kuwait Finance House during the year ended 31 
December 2009, we certify confidently that all activities were practiced in 
compliance with Islamic Shari’ah and no violations have occurred, to the best of our 
knowledge (KFH, 2010, p.19). 
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Profits distribution and charging losses to investment accounts is in conformity with 
the bases approved by the Board in accordance with Islamic jurisprudence (FIB, 
2008, p. 38). 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Although there was generally a lack of disclosure about Fatwa provided by the SSB to 
the management, five reports stated that they followed up their Fatwa, indicating some 
SSBs attest whether the management followed the guidance provided by the Shari’ah 
Board regarding new products and projects to ensure that the institution meets the ethical 
values of Shari’ah. For instance, the SSB of GFH reviewed the institution’s investment 
activities and compared them with the previously issued Fatwas and rulings during the 
financial year ended 31st December 2009 and found them compatible with the already 
issued Fatwas and rulings credentials. Only the SBB reports of BIB and MT disclosed 
the approval of new products as found in the following statement: The Shari’ah Advisory 
Body (SAB) held six meetings to review various products, transactions and processes in 
line with the Shari’ah requirements and approved the profit rate declaration for Family 
and General takaful products (MT, 2010, p.07) 
 
Internal Shari’ah audit is an independent department examining and evaluating the extent of 
compliance with Shari’ah rule, Fatwas, instructions etc. It is expected that the SSB would 
cooperate with the Shari’ah internal auditor in order to enhance shareholders’ value and the 
confidence of stakeholders. Only two institutions, BIB and Cpivesta, disclosed information 
under this sub-theme over three years. JIB disclosed information in 2010 only. In the case of 
BIB (Annual Report 2010, p.36), the SSB verifies the documents and procedures to scrutinize 
either directly or through the Shari’ah Internal Audit department. The Shari’ah Internal Audit 
department carries out monitoring functions by obtaining information that were deemed 
necessary to confirm that the Bank did not violate the principles and provisions of Islamic 
Shari’ah. 
4.4 Unlawful transactions 
As described in the AAOIFI Shari’ah Review, the main purpose of the requirement of Shari’ah 
review in Islamic banks is to ensure that banks conduct their business in compliance with the 
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Shari’ah rules and regulations. 10 IFIs disclosed information under this category as shown in 
Table 6. There is a lack of disclosure made by KFH and FIB over the three years. As can be 
seen from Table 6 the level of disclosure under this category is very low comparing to other 
categories and the mean level of disclosure ranges from 0.0 to 0.19. Based on the three-year 
mean, BIB scored the highest. IFIs mainly disclose information related to two sub-themes: 1) 
gains resulted from sources prohibited by Shari’ah, and 2) the disposal of, or intend to dispose, 
such gains. In terms of identifying whether there were any defects in the income that they 
examined, the Shari’ah reports of BIB 2008, IIAB 2009 and 2008 and TI over 3 years, reveal 
that there was no gain resulted from sources prohibited by Shari’ah. In spite of the reporting 
of no defects in the transactions, eight Shari’ah Boards reported how the management had 
disposed or intended to dispose the unlawful revenue. However, none of the SSB reports 
disclose their view about the necessity of the transactions that generated unlawful income, 
recommendations to rectify defects in products, and actions taken by management to rectify 
defects in products. This is consistent with the results of previous studies (e.g., Maali et al., 
2006; Hanifa and Hudaib, 2007a). 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
4.5 Zakah 
As shown in Table 7, the total number of companies disclosed information under this category 
is 7. Revealed in Table 2, the mean level of disclosure ranges from 0.33 to 1.00, the lowest 
being MT. Overall, there is a lack of disclosure from five institutions AIB, GFH, KHF, Arcapita 
and IIAB.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
Most of the disclosures are attestations from the SSB that the sources and uses of Zakah and 
the amount computed for Zakah were in line with the Islamic principles, as evidenced in the 
following statement: 
Zakah was calculated according to the provisions and principles of Islamic Shari’ah. 
The Bank distributed Zakah on the statutory reserve, general reserve and retained 
earnings. The shareholders should pay their portion of Zakah on their shares as 
stated in the financial report (BIB, 2010, p. 37). 
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Auditing of the information on Zakah is deemed important to the users of Islamic annual 
reports and it is consistent with disclosure practices of Islamic law. The SSB opinion on 
Zakah sources and calculation should be disclosed in the SSB report to determine whether 
Zakah is not understated. Stakeholders expect the SSB to review Zakah calculations, 
Zakah distributions and report on its compliance with Shari’ah (Abu Baker and Naser, 
2000; Maali et al., 2006; Yaacob and Donglah, 2012).    
In sum, our results indicate that discrepancy in terms of the level and the extent of 
disclosure exists between the disclosed information in SSB reports of Islamic banks and 
the disclosure index developed in this study. We also found that the disclosure of each 
Islamic bank varies across the 3-year period, suggesting that disclosed information are 
not static, thereby contradicting the principles of full and comprehensive disclosure and 
accountability. The findings are surprising because IFIs, as an institutions follow 
Shari’ah, are expected to disclose more on those information to reflect accountability and 
not only to society, but also ultimately to God (Hanifa and Hudaib, 2007b) . In fact, the 
establishment of the SSB report is to provide assurance and maintain the confidence of 
stakeholders on the compliance of their products and operations with Shari’ah, therefore 
the content of the information in SBB reports should reflect the importance of the report 
for Stakeholder.  
 
5. Conclusions 
This study reports on the findings of content analysis of SSB reports made by IFIs. We 
investigate the nature and extent of IFIs disclosed SSB reports and the elements of information 
contained in those reports. Specifically this study focuses on the disclosures of SSB reports in 
terms of five categories, including report format, the background of SSB, audit process, 
unlawful transactions and Zakah. The study finds that the level of disclosures made overall by 
IFIs in the sample is rather low compared to the stakeholder expectations measured by the 
designed Shari’ah reporting index. The Shari’ah audit reporting index adopted in the study 
reveals the score for report format of 0.7, SSB background of 0.58, audit process of 0.4, 
unlawful transaction of 0.11 and Zakah of 04, are all below the benchmark of 1.  
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Our study provides results on the level of disclosures of SSB audit reports as part of corporate 
governance attempted by IFIs to fulfill their ethical and religion obligations and to demonstrate 
their responsibility as Islamic financial organizations. In line with Islamic principles, IFIs need 
to fulfill an ethical role inherent in their character as an ‘Islamic’ entity. Clearly the significance 
of SSB audit reporting should be seen along with the broader institutional development of 
corporate governance in IFIs. While socio-political factors may restrain the level of disclosure 
concerning SSB reporting, increasing of the level of monitoring within banks and organizations 
can lead to greater disclosure (Paino et al., 2011). Also, these results may suggest that uniform 
disclosure standards such as the AAOIFI standards across the globe need to be implemented in 
order to ensure a uniform level of disclosure by IFIs (Karim, 2001; Paino et al., 2011). In 
summary, although SSBs are envisaged to provoke greater monitoring function and play a 
strategic role in the process of ensuring greater compliance with Islamic laws and principles, 
current SSB audit reporting is far below the stakeholder expectations based on the requirements 
of the AAOIFI and findings of the prior literature. However, since the study is based on annual 
reports, it does not capture other forms of disclosure through company websites, press releases, 
special booklets and pamphlets.  
The findings of this study provide some implications for further research and policy 
development. First, it would be interesting to investigate motivations of the IFIs for not 
complying with the requirement of the AAOIFI on Shari’ah report, resulting in the gap in 
disclosure. An understanding of the motives would help both policy makers and practitioners 
to identify appropriate policies and strategies in the future with a view to raising the 
compliance. Second, there seems to be a need to set up an enforcement agent ensuring the IFIs 
follow the AAOIFI standards. Our study shows although the AAOIFI standards have 
emphasized the importance of providing SSB audit reports, the implementation of reporting 
practice seems to be lower than the expectation.  Obligatory reporting requires a system to 
monitor and supervise the behaviors of individual institutions. At the moment there is a lack of 
such a system. It is also relevant for policy makers to look at the coordination of governance 
mechanisms across the countries to ensure the consistency of SSB audit reporting among IFIs. 
Third, policy makers and researcher should further investigate if such a gap in disclosures is 
the result of difference of corporate governance among countries; such a difference can be 
caused by the varying levels of social, economic and regulatory developments among the Gulf 
countries and Malaysia.  
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Table 1: Shari’ah audit reporting index (SAI) ranking of 12 IFIs 
IFIs Country 
AAOIFI 
Requirement 
SAI 
Rank 2010 2009 2008 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank 
(ADIB) UAE No 0.33 0.33 0.33 11 
Bahrain Islamic Bank (BIB) Bahrain Yes 0.60 0.60 0.60 4 
Gulf Finance House (GFH) Bahrain Yes 0.38 0.32 0.32 10 
Albaraka Islamic Bank 
(AIB) Bahrain Yes 0.61 0.61 0.61 3 
Kuwait Finance House 
(KFH) Kuwait No 0.35 0.17 0.12 12 
Arcapita Bahrain Yes 0.36 0.34 0.34 9 
Jordan Islamic Bank (JIB) Jordan Yes 0.70 0.63 0.63 1 
Islamic International Arab 
Bank (IIAB) Jordan Yes 0.38 0.33 0.41 8 
Malaysian Takaful (MT) Malaysia No 0.67 0.32 0.32 7 
Capivista Bahrain Yes 0.67 0.62 0.57 2 
Faisal Islamic Bank (FIB) Sudan Yes 0.57 0.57 0.62 5 
Takaful International (TI) Bahrain Yes 0.49 0.53 0.54 6 
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Table 2:  A summary of the SAI disclosures 
 
 Report Format 
Background of the 
SSB   Audit Process   
Unlawful 
Transaction   Zakah   
201
0 
200
9 
200
8 
mea
n 
201
0 
200
9 
200
8 
mea
n 
201
0 
200
9 
200
8 
mea
n 
201
0 
200
9 
200
8 
mea
n 
201
0 
200
9 
200
8 
mea
n 
ADIB 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
BIB 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.5 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.6 0.14 0.14 0.29 0.19 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
GFH 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.5 0.50 0.20 0.20 0.3 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 
AIB 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.5 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.4 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 
KFH 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.42 0.50 0.50 0.25 0.42 0.50 0.10 0.10 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 
Arcapita 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.40 0.30 0.30 0.33 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 
JIB 1.00 0.75 0.75 0.83 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.60 0.50 0.50 0.53 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 
IIAB 0.75 0.50 0.75 0.67 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.4 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 
MT 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.5 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.60 0.10 0.10 0.27 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.05 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 
Capivist
a 
0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.50 0.50 0.58 0.70 0.30 0.30 0.33 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 
FIB 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.50 0.50 0.75 0.58 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
TI 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.50 0.50 0.42 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
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Average 0.75 0.67 0.69 0.70 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.51 0.36 0.36 0.40 0.11 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.50 0.42 0.42 0.44 
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Table 3: Disclosures of standard format of reports 
 
Sub-theme 
AAOIFI 
Requirement 
No of IFIs Disclosed 
2010 2009 2008 
Title of the report Yes 12 11 11 
Addressee Yes 7 6 6 
Date of the report 
Yes 10 10 10 
Report signed by all members Yes 7 6 6 
Mean  9 8.25 8.25 
 
Table 4: Disclosure of the background of SSB members 
 
Sub-theme 
AAOIFI 
Requirement 
No of IFIs 
2010 2009 2008 
Name of SSB No 12 12 12 
Pictures of members No 5 5 4 
Qualification and background of 
members 
No 4 4 4 
Remuneration of members No 6 6 6 
 
Table 5: Disclosure of audit process related information 
 
Sub-theme 
AAOIFI 
Requiremen
t 
No of IFIs 
2010 2009 2008 
Number of meetings held No 4 3 2 
Examination of documents based on sample Yes 3 - - 
Examination of all documents No 3 3 3 
Opinion on compliance to Shari’ah principles Yes 12 11 11 
Scope of audit Yes 12 10 10 
Certification of the distribution of profits/loss 
complying to Shari’ah 
Yes 12 8 8 
Provision of fatwa (consultancy) on new 
products 
Yes - - - 
Follow up fatwa Yes 7 6 6 
Liaise with Shari’ah internal auditor No 2 2 2 
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Table 6: Disclosure of unlawful transactions 
 
Sub-theme 
AAOIFI 
requirement 
No of IFIs 
2010 2009 2008 
No gains resulted from any sources or means 
prohibited 
Yes 1 2 3 
Nature and amount of unlawful transactions No 0 0 0 
Reasons for undertaking such transactions No 0 0 0 
The Shari’ah Board’s view about the necessity of 
these transactions 
No 0 0 0 
How an institution disposed, or intends to dispose of 
such revenues 
Yes 8 7 6 
Recommendation to rectify product defects No 0 0 0 
 
Table 7: Disclosure of Zakah 
 
Sub-theme 
AAOIFI 
requirement 
No of IFIs 
2010 2009 2008 
SSB attestation that Zakah has been computed 
according to Shari’ah 
Yes 7 6 6 
SSB verification of compliance to Shari’ah of 
sources and uses of Zakah 
Yes 7 6 6 
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Appendix 1  
Themes  AAOIFI Requirement 
 
1.Sub-theme  
Title of the report Yes 
Addressee Yes 
Date of the report Yes 
Report signed by all members Yes 
2.Background of SSB members  
Name of SSB No 
Pictures of members No 
Qualification and background of members No 
Remuneration of members No 
3.Audit process  
Number of meetings held No 
Examination of documents based on sample Yes 
Examination of all documents No 
Opinion on compliance to Shari’ah principles Yes 
Scope of audit Yes 
Certification of the distribution of profits/loss 
complying  Shari’ah 
Yes 
Provision of Fatwa (consultancy) on new 
products 
Yes 
Follow up Fatwa Yes 
Liaise with Shari’ah internal auditor No 
4.Unlawful transactions  
No gains resulted from any sources or means 
prohibited 
Yes 
Nature and amount of unlawful transactions No 
Reasons for undertaking such transactions No 
The Shari’ah Board’s view about the necessity 
of these transactions 
No 
How an institution disposed, or intends to 
dispose of such revenues 
Yes 
Recommendation to rectify product defects No 
5.Zakah  
SSB attestation that Zakah has been computed 
according to Shari’ah 
Yes 
SSB verification of compliance to Shari’ah of 
sources and uses of Zakah 
Yes 
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